Program Profile: Rochester (N.Y.) Domestic Violence Court Judicial Monitoring

This program was designed to provide judicial monitoring of people convicted of domestic violence through frequent court appearances before a judge. The goal was to ensure compliance with program requirements and deter future violence and re-abuse of victims. The program is rated Ineffective. There were no statistically significant differences between the intervention group and control group in rearrests, attendance at court-ordered programs, or completion of programs.

An Ineffective rating implies that implementing the program is unlikely to result in the intended outcome(s).

This program's rating is based on evidence that includes at least one high-quality randomized controlled trial.

An Ineffective rating implies that implementing the program is unlikely to result in the intended outcome(s).

This program's rating is based on evidence that includes at least one high-quality randomized controlled trial.

Program Goal

The Rochester (N.Y.) Domestic Violence (DV) Court Judicial Monitoring program was designed to provide judicial monitoring by the court, which involved frequent court appearances by the person convicted of domestic violence before a judge. The goal was to ensure compliance with program requirements and other court orders, and deter future violence and re-abuse of victims. The court imposed sanctions in cases of noncompliance and rewarded them with incentives in cases of compliance.

Target Population

The program was designed to provide judicial monitoring to people convicted of domestic violence who had been ordered to participate in a court-mandated program (including batterer programs or substance abuse treatment programs). The judicial monitoring was conducted in addition to the services received by the people convicted of domestic violence in the mandated programs.

Program Components

Protocols were developed to specify:

• The schedule for court appearances under judicial monitoring
• A schedule of sanctions and incentives to be used in response to compliance or noncompliance
• A “script” for judges to follow in their interactions with people convicted of domestic violence 

Schedule for court appearances: The person convicted of domestic violence received a court appearance date for their first post-disposition monitoring for 2 weeks after sentencing. The protocol specified a schedule of appearances every 2 weeks initially. Subsequent dates could be more or less frequent, depending on the compliance of the individual with court orders and program requirements (for example, if the person was compliant, the appearances could be changed to every 3 weeks; if the person was noncompliant, the appearances could be changed to weekly).

Sanctions and incentives: Infractions on the part of the person convicted of domestic violence were linked to sanctions. Sanctions could include verbal admonishments, more frequent court reporting, jail, restarting a program, and electronic monitoring. Conversely, compliance or achievements—such as complying with a court mandate or obtaining a GED or employment—were linked to incentives, such as praise from the judge or a reduction in the frequency of court appearances.

Script for the judges: This component was developed as a framework to guide judges through their interactions with people convicted of domestic violence. During appearances, the judge was expected to:

• Review behavioral expectations and consequences of noncompliance
• Verify compliance with court orders and program mandates
• Apply incentives and sanctions as determined by the sanction schedule
• Directly interact with the person
• Set a return-to-court date and explain explicitly reasons for any changes in the monitoring schedule
• Repeat that a protective order was in effect and program rules must be followed

Key Personnel

In some judicial monitoring programs, individuals may report to a judge, to a compliance officer, or to a referee. In the Rochester DV Court, all judicial monitoring was provided by judges.

Program Theory

Advocates of judicial monitoring often suggest that reductions in recidivism can be explained by deterrence theory, which predicts that increased surveillance will deter future violence. Some studies suggest that reductions in recidivism should be attributed to their perceptions of procedural justice—that is, that compliance increases when they believe that the procedure, courts, and/or judges are fair.

Study

Labriola and colleagues (2012) used an experimental design to assess the impact of a judicial monitoring program in two Rochester (N.Y.) domestic violence courts on future violence. The study included individuals enrolled between October 2006 and December 2009. Three judges participated in the study.

To be included in the study, participants had to be either a) convicted and sentenced to a conditional discharge or probation or b) disposed with an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD). All had to be ordered to either a batterer program or substance abuse treatment. A total of 155 individuals were recruited into the study. They were randomly assigned to either the treatment condition (program enrollment plus judicial monitoring, n = 85) or a control condition (program enrollment only, n = 70). Eight participants were later excluded from the study: six were excluded from the treatment group because they were the only participants in the study sample arrested on violent felony charges; another two were excluded from the analysis because of missing data. The final sample consisted of 147 subjects (77 treatment group participants; 70 control group participants).

Treatment group participants received program treatment plus judicial monitoring. Control group participants were returned to court only if noncompliance would result in resentencing (e.g., a rearrest or program termination). Control group participants were also assigned a single return court date 8 months post-randomization for the interview.

The two groups were very similar on baseline characteristics. The two groups were compared on 45 baseline characteristics, and only 4 comparisons were significant. Compared with control group participants, treatment group participants were:

• More likely to have been arrested for a violent felony charge (these cases were excluded from the analysis)
• Less likely to have a prior conviction on any charge
• More likely to have a prior conviction on a violent felony offense
• Less likely to be disposed with an ACD disposition as opposed to a conviction

The groups had similar demographic characteristics. The average age was 33.9 years for the treatment group and 34.6 years for the control group. The racial/ethnic composition of the samples was as follows: Black, 55 percent and 45 percent for the treatment and control groups, respectively; Hispanic/Latino, 18 percent and 22 percent; white, 27 percent and 32 percent; and Asian, 0 percent and 1 percent.

Official data records were collected from the Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) Application and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. The IDV application was filled in by the court’s analyst and used to track program mandates/attendance, court appearances, and compliance. Arrest data was collected 1 year post-disposition.

Bivariate analyses were performed to determine whether there were statistically significant differences in outcomes between the two groups and to assess whether any of the independent variables (e.g., number of court appearances) were significantly related to outcomes of interest. Subgroup analyses were conducted to determine the potential impact incentives had on treatment group participants.

Subgroup Analysis

Labriola and colleagues (2012) conducted subgroup analyses to determine if incentives impacted the outcomes of treatment group participants. Individuals monitored by the one judge who did not incentivize achievements (such as scheduling or attending an orientation for a mandated program, or obtaining a GED or employment) attended statistically significantly more program sessions and were more likely to complete assigned programs than those assigned to judges who incentivized achievement by reducing monitoring frequency.

These sources were used in the development of the program profile: